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"In war, truth is the first casualty" - Aeschylus
I thank the Florida A & M University Law Review for this op-
portunity to discuss the legal regimes for the Obama Administration's
role in the Libyan conflict. I will address the international legal re-
gime and then the United States legal regime in a method I call the
Dedoublement Analytique or Second Vision method.' By starting my
analysis with international law and coming back into the U.S. foreign
relations law, my goal is twofold: 1) to enhance the understanding of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. I thank Professor
Jeremy Levitt for his insights. This article is dedicated to all Africans.
1. This method contrasts with the separate internal U.S. foreign relations law method
that dominates discussion of these topics in the United States and the separate external
international law method which United States leaders have to address with foreign and
international counterparts. As described in earlier work, I believe it is essential for the
American citizen to be conversant with both of these methods of approaching international
law in order to see more clearly what is at stake in a particular situation. See Benjamin G.
Davis, A Citizen Observer's View of the U.S. Approach to the War on Terrorism, 17
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 465-479 (2008).
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the American citizen of the interplay between the international and
domestic planes, aiid 2) to encourage citizens to use this method to un-
derstand both the content and context of their government's
pronouncements - particularly about armed conflict, but in general
with regard to matters whatever the ostensible international dimen-
sion. The hope is this method will permit citizens to be less dependent
on the official presentation of a situation and also help citizens con-
sider alternatives that might not be expressed in the official
presentation.
Please note that the Libyan conflict has played out with breath-
taking speed in the context of the already accelerated pace of the Arab
Spring. Though I suspect the sources of uprising long predate the con-
ventional wisdom as to its start, the Arab Spring appears to have
started with the December 17, 2010 vegetable salesman 2 setting fire to
himself in Tunisia.3 It is difficult to definitively state or confirm the
veracity of facts or capture the extent of what happened or is happen-
ing in Libya.4 In this regard, I feel in a similar position in examining
facts and events as I was in Paris in the 1989-1991 period when time
seemed to speed up with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the opening of
Eastern Europe, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is with that
fluidity of the current situation in Libya in mind that I provide these
first thoughts.
2. Borrowing from Francesco Alberoni's remarkable work on movements and
institutions, Mohammed Bouazizi's personal sacrifice appeared to be the ultimate moving
expression of an individual's "depressive overload" at the contradictions between his
external social reality and his internal reality. His act appears to have triggered a similar
experience in many others creating what might be termed a "nascent state" of consciousness
for those persons similarly reacting to the oppression and contradictions. As these persons
have sought affinity with others, we have witnessed the development of movements. A full
presentation of Francesco Alberoni's insights on movements and institutions is beyond the
scope of this paper. See generally, FRANCESCO ALBERONI, MOVEMENT AND INSTITUTION
(Patricia C. Arden Delmoro trans., Columbia University Press 1984) (1977). That Mr.
Bouazizi's act occurred in a technological environment which allows rapid global
dissemination of a single event may have spurred the more rapid development of affinity in
much wider circles than might have occurred for a similar act in the 1990 period with the
fall of the Soviet Union. On the role of technology and movements see, Benjamin G. Davis,
Online Influence Space(s) and Digital Influence Waves: In Honor of Charly, 25 OHIO ST. J.
ON Disp. RESOL. 201-246 (2010).
3. A remarkably effective way of viewing the recent developments can be found at
Garry Blight, Sheila Pulham and Paul Torpey, Arab Spring: an Interactive Timeline of
Middle East Protests, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
interactive/201 1/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-timeline.
4. Glenn Greenwald, The Human Rights "success" in Libya, SALON.COM (Jan. 6, 2011),
http://www.salon.com/2012/01/26/the-human-rights-success-in_1ibyalsingleton/.
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I. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME
With the above caveats, there are several key events in the De-
cember 2010 - February 2011 period, which predates the United
Nations Security Council intervention. First, the early support by Col.
Muammar Gadhafi of the Tunisian regime against the Tunisian pro-
tests, followed by additional protests and the resignations of diplomats
of the Libyan government had a significant impact on the developing
situation in Libya. In addition, the Libyan government's repression of
protests and the arrest of a human rights campaigner in Benghazi,5
the deaths of civilians, and the incitement to hostility and violence
against the civilian population made from the highest level of the Lib-
yan government increased the pressure for outside intervention.6
A. Libyan Obligations Under the International Legal Regime
In late 2010 and early 2011, as protests and internal distur-
bances joined with governmental reaction, the Libyan state was, at a
minimum, already subject to international human rights obligations
under treaty law or customary international law through the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights7 and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.8 Whether, in practice, the Libyan state rec-
ognized and respected the human rights of the persons within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction internally is not the initial con-
cern for the following reason. It is axiomatic that no state can invoke
its internal law as a justification for its failure to perform a treaty.9
The principal point is that these international human rights treaty ob-
ligations were and remain upon the Libyan state regardless of internal
treatment.
5. Supra note 4.
6. U.N.S.C. Res. 1970, Feb. 26, 2011, U.N. Doc., S/RES/1970 (2011).
7. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. G.A. Res. 217A, 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N.
Doc. A/810, p. 71 (1948), available at http://www.un.orglen/documents/udhr/. Concerning
the evolution of such rights into customary international law see supra at note 1, Jordan J.
Paust, International Law, Dignity, Democracy, and the Arab Spring, 18 BARRY L. REV.
(Forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1991432.
8. UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html [accessed 26 January 2012]. Libya ratified May 15, 1970.
9. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U. N. T.
331. The inability to extract oneself from one's international obligations through internal
law is a well settled rule of customary international law crystallized in the Vienna
Convention language.
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As the protests rapidly evolved into open rebellion against the
Libyan government, the Libyan situation could be viewed not only in
terms of the Libyan state's international human rights obligations, but
also in terms of the Libyan state's international obligations in a Non-
International Armed Conflict (NIAC) under treaty and customary in-
ternational humanitarian law.10 This NIAC appeared to be between
rebels in the East centered around Benghazi and the central govern-
ment, but significant disturbances appeared to occur in the capital of
Tripoli and other places in the country. An international dimension to
this situation appears to have also been present with the entrance
(with the consent of the then Libyan government) of mercenaries from
other nations to assist the government against the rebels.
In addition to international human rights and humanitarian
law obligations derived from treaties and customary law, Libya is sub-
ject to its obligations in other regional international organizations such
as the African Union,11 the League of Arab States (Arab League)12 and
the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (formerly the Organization of
the Islamic Conference). 13 Finally, but not exclusively, Libya is a
member of the United Nations with its obligations under the Charter
of the United Nations.14
B. International Reaction to the Developments in Libya
The Libyan obligations described above interplay with the pow-
ers and roles granted by Libya and the regional and international
communities to the regional and international governmental organiza-
10. Geneva Conventions I-IV, 1949 (Libya ratified them May 22, 1956) and Protocols I
(involving two countries or International Armed Conflicts) and II (Non-International Armed
Conflicts like civil wars) Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 1977 (Libya ratified them
on July 7, 1978). These treaty obligations also crystallize customary international
humanitarian law to some extent though such a discussion is beyond the ambit of this
paper. For a study by the International Committee of the Red Cross of customary
international humanitarian law see http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/home. This
study has been the subject of discussion in the United States under the U.S. foreign
relations law vision - a domestic U.S. debate that appears more related to internal
justifications of U.S. actions in Iraq and Afghanistan in the War on Terror - rather than
international law. It is beyond the scope of this paper to do more than highlight these
discussions.
11. Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2000, http://www.africa-union.org/
root/au/AboutAU/ConstitutiveAct en.htm.
12. LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES, http://www.arableagueonline.org.
13. PERMANENT MISSION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, http://
www.oic-un.org/index.asp.
14. Charter of the United Nations, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/
charter/index.shtml.
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tions in our international legal system. Separate from these structures
(but interrelated), states on their own15 or in combination with other
states, non-governmental institutions and individuals played roles
(and continue to play roles) in the developments in Libya along with
these regional and international governmental organizations. These
further channels influenced the reaction of other member states and
the Secretariat of these entities in their exercise of the relevant powers
of the international governmental organizations.
The nature of the violence against civilian populations in the
period preceding the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970
of February 26, 2011 led to condemnations by the Arab League, the
African Union, and the Secretary General of the Organization of Is-
lamic Cooperation as serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law in Libya.16 In addition, the United
Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council dispatched an inde-
pendent international commission of inquiry to investigate all alleged
violations of human rights law in Libya. The task of the commission
was to establish the facts and circumstances of such violations, deter-
mine the extent of the crimes perpetrated and, if possible, identify
those responsible.17 Many organizations responded to the Libyan
events but it is beyond the scope of this essay to explore all of them.
Below I discuss the different emphases of the United Nations Security
Council, the African Union, the Arab League, the Organization of Is-
lamic Cooperation (formerly the Organization of the Islamic
Conference) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the events
in Libya. Understanding the actions of these five particular interna-
tional governmental organizations gives context for what President
Obama confronted on the international plane while he formulated the
United States' approach and addressed domestic plane concerns (dis-
cussed in the next section).
15. See, e.g., the French recognition of the National Transitional Council as the
legitimate representatives of the Libyan people on Mar. 10, 2011 in the run up to the United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 authorization, inter alia, of the use of force. For
discussion of the process of recognition of the National Transitional Council, see Stefan
Talmon, Recognition of the Libyan National Transitional Council, 15 ASIL Insights 16, Jun.
16, 2011 available at http://www.asil.orginsights110616.cfm.
16. Supra note 7.
17. Id.
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1. The United Nations Security Council - Diplomatic and
Military Role
The initial response of the United Nations Security Council in
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970 of February 26, 2011
was under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter taking measures
under its Article 41 powers (i.e., not involving the use of armed force).18
Complying with the Security Council response became an obligation of
all states whether acting as states or in international agencies.' 9 The
response was wide-ranging: demanding an immediate end to the vio-
lence, urging restraint by the Libyan authorities, referral to the
International Criminal Court, establishment of an arms embargo,
travel ban, asset freeze, and designation of criteria related to human
rights abuses for selection of those subject to the travel ban and asset
freeze, creating a new Sanctions Committee, calling for humanitarian
assistance by all member states to facilitate and make available hu-
manitarian and related assistance in Libya, and expression of a
commitment to review the situation.20
When the measures taken by Libyan authorities were deemed
insufficient, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution
1973 (2011) on March 17, 2011 pursuant to its Chapter VII powers to
address the deteriorating situation.21 The Security Council demanded
an immediate cease-fire and a complete end to violence and all attacks
against, and abuses of, civilians. 22 While stressing the need to find a
diplomatic solution (noting the Secretary General's Special Envoy to
Libya and the work of the Peace and Security Council of the African
Union), the Security Council authorized, inter alia, the use of armed
force. 23 Armed force by member states acting nationally or through
regional organizations or arrangements was authorized to protect civil-
ians and civilian populated areas under the threat of attack while
excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan
18. "The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of
the United Nations to apply such measures." Article 41, Charter of the United Nations.
19. Article 48, Charter of the United Nations ("1. The action required to carry out the
decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security
shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security
Council may determine. 2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United
Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which
they are members.").
20. Supra note 7.
21. U.N.S.C. Res. 1973, Mar. 17, 2011, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (2011).
22. Id.
23. Id.
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territory.24 In particular, the Security Council noted the special role of
the League of Arab States while recognizing that member states could
operate through other regional organizations. 2 5 It established a no fly
zone over Libya, reinforced its prior authorizations of the arms em-
bargo, the ban on flights, the asset freeze, and designations of those
subject to sanctions, and created a panel of experts to assist the Sanc-
tions Committee. 26
With the authorization of armed force by the United Nations
Security Council and the deployment of force through the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization (NATO) - led bombing campaign, the arming
of rebel forces, and the attacks against regime leaders, the legal regime
governing this conflict appeared to shift from purely international
human rights law, to a mixed international human rights law with in-
ternational humanitarian law for a NIAC, and within international
humanitarian law to international humanitarian law for an Interna-
tional Armed Conflict (IAC). 2 7 The status of the rebels moved from
rebels against a government that had effective control of the country
into a more fluid setting where the rebels had control of significant
swaths of the country, to a situation where the rebels supplanted the
Gadhafi government control of the country. In sum, the actors with
effective control of Libya changed while the international obligations
on the state of Libya remained the same.
By September 16, 2011, the United Nations Security Council in
its Resolution 2009 acted under Chapter VII under its Article 41 pow-
ers (not involving the use of armed force) to welcome the developments
in Libya, call for an inclusive, representative transitional Government
of Libya and emphasize the need for the transitional period to be un-
derpinned by a commitment to democracy, good governance, rule of law
and respect for human rights. 2 8 The Security Council went on to seek
to encourage the National Transitional Council to proceed in this man-
ner and in this regard established a United Nations Support Mission in




27. For a discussion of the complexities of characterizing the conflict and counseling
the Libyan rebels on the Law of Armed Conflict see lain Scobbie, Operationalizing the Law
of Armed Conflict for Dissident Forces in Libya, EJIL Talk (Aug. 31, 2011), available at
http://www.ejiltalk.org/operationalising-the-law-of-armed-conflict-for-dissident-forces-in-
libya/#more-3711. Issues arose as to the relevant rules for targeting and detention practices
and teaching to resist reprisals or what was translated into Arabic as "revenge."
28. U.N.S.C. Res. 2009, Sept. 16, 2011, S/RES/2009 (2011).
29. Id.
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freeze and, although leaving them in place, signaled its readiness at
the appropriate time to lift the no fly zone and ban on flights.30
Shortly after the death of Col. Muammar Gadhafi on October
20, 2011, and the National Transitional Council's "Declaration of Lib-
eration" of October 23, 2011, the United Nations Security Council in its
Resolution 2016, acting under its Chapter VII powers, terminated the
authorization of use of force to protect civilians as well as the no fly
zone of its Resolution 1973.31 On October 31, 2011, in its Resolution
2017, the Security Council, mindful of its primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security and concerned about
arms proliferation, called on the Libyan authorities, states in the re-
gion, and all member states to take appropriate action to avoid arms
proliferation that might fuel terrorist or other activities in the region. 32
On December 2, 2011, in its Resolution 2022, the United Nations Se-
curity Council extended in time and scope the mandate of the United
Nations Support Mission in Libya including authorizing it to address
proliferation issues.33
2. The African Union and Other International Governmental
Organizations - Diplomatic Role
a. African Union
Although united in condemnation, the African Union response
began to differ from that of the Security Council. In its communique of
February 23, 2011, the African Union condemned the excessive use of
force and lethal weapons against peaceful protestors in violation of
human rights and international humanitarian law and called for re-
straint and dialogue between all the Libyan people. 34 Among other
things, the African Union emphasized the legitimacy of the aspirations
of the Libyan people for democracy, political reform, justice and socio-
economic development and urged those aspirations be respected.35
30. Id.
31. U.N.S.C. Res. 2016, Dec. 2, 2011, S/RES/2016 (2011).
32. U.N.S.C. Res. 2017, Oct. 31, 2011, S/RES/2017 (2011).
33. U.N.S.C. Res. 2022, Oct. 27, 2011, S/RES/2022 (2011).
34. African Union Peace and Security Council 261st Meeting Communique of February
23, 2011, (PSC/PR/COMM(CCLXI).
35. Id. In this same period, three non-governmental organizations - the Egyptian
Initiative for Personal Rights ("EIPR"), Human Rights Watch, and INTERIGHTS submitted
a joint request for provisional measures to the African Human Rights Commission. On
March 3, the African Human Rights Commission initiated proceedings against Libya in the
African Human Rights Court which made an order for provisional measures on March 25,
2011 with which the Libyan government did not comply. See, Anna Dolidze, African Court
8 Vol. 7: 1:1
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By March 10, 2011, the differences with the Security Council
were growing more significant as the African Union rejected any for-
eign military intervention, whatever its form, and called for an
approach which came to be called the African Union Roadmap ("AU
Roadmap") consisting of 1) immediate cessation of all hostilities, 2) co-
operation of the competent Libyan authorities to facilitate
humanitarian assistance to the needy populations, 3) the protection of
foreign nationals, including the African migrants living in Libya, and
4) the adoption and implementation of the political reforms necessary
for the elimination of the causes of the current crisis.36 The African
Union created an ad-hoc High-Level Committee on Libya, comprising
five Heads of State and Government and the Chair of the Peace and
Security Commission, who were to engage with all parties in Libya,
facilitate an inclusive dialogue among the Libyan parties on the appro-
priate reforms, and engage the African Union's partners (in particular
the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference,
the European Union and the United Nations) to facilitate coordination
of efforts and seek their support for their resolution of the crisis.3 7 The
African Union called on its member states to provide logistical and hu-
manitarian support to all African migrant workers wishing to leave
Libya as well as to those neighboring countries forced to bear a dispro-
portionate burden and to the countries of origin to facilitate the socio-
economic reinsertion of these migrant workers. 38 The African Union
also recalled the Organization of African Unity Convention on the
Elimination of Mercenarism and sought the gathering of information
on the reported presence of mercenaries in Libya and their actions.39
With the March 17, 2011 United Nations Security Council Reso-
lution 1973 authorization for the use of force to protect civilians and
civilian populated areas under the threat of attack (while excluding a
foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory),
the divergences between the Security Council's mixed diplomatic and
use of force approach and the African Union's diplomatic approach be-
came more apparent. As described in the April 26, 2011 Communique
of the Peace and Security Council, the African Union diplomatic ap-
proach yielded talks by the African Union ad-hoc Committee of Heads
on Human and Peoples Rights - Response to the Situation in Libya, 15 ASIL Insight 20
(Jul. 26, 2011), available at http://www.asil.org/insights110725.cfm.






FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW
of State and Government with representatives of the Libyan Govern-
ment and the Transitional National Council of Libya. The ground was
prepared for ceasefire negotiations by all Libyan parties under the aus-
pices of the African Union, the League of Arab States, the Organization
of the Islamic Conference, the European Union and the United Na-
tions.40 The African Union continued outreach to these international
governmental organizations as well as other formations such as the
Libya Contact Group (A group of NATO countries, the Secretary Gen-
eral of NATO, Arab States, and other countries 41), the BRICS (Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa) and bilateral partners request-
ing they extend the necessary cooperation to the African Union's
efforts, bearing in mind the provisions of Chapter VIII of the United
Nations Charter on the role of regional arrangements in the settlement
of disputes among and within their Member States.42
While African Union efforts to form a diplomatic solution on
Libya were being made, the African Union made a separate declaration
on April 28, 2011 after looking at the state of peace and security in the
continent within the context of the uprisings that took place in North
Africa.43 In a wide ranging declaration addressing the peace and se-
curity architecture of Africa, the African Union expressed serious
concern that, in some crisis and conflict situations, African efforts to
attain peace are undermined by foreign actors, whose motives are, at
times, neither complementary to, nor consistent with the implementa-
tion of African solutions to African problems. 44
While respecting the Resolution 1973, the African Union made
it a point to stress the need for all countries and organizations involved
40. African Union Peace and Security Council 275th Meeting Communique of April 26,
2011, (PSC/MIN/COMM.2(CCLXXV).
41. The Libya Contact Group first formal meeting was March 29, 2011, and further key
meetings were held April 13, 2011 (calling for Gadhafi to leave power), May 5, 2011, and
July 15, 2011; NATO Secretary General to attend Libya Conference in London, March 28,
2011 available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-74AEF80D-A91C4D92/natolive/news
71815.htm?mode=pressrelease; NATO Secretary General travels to Doha to attend the
Libya Contact Group meeting, April 13, 2011 available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-
227754C2-DC6799E9/natolive/news_72305.htm?mode=pressrelease; NATO Secretary
General travels to Rome to attend the Libya Contact Group meeting, May 5, 2011 available
at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-15E77275-FAA4C4DI/natolive/news_73125.htm?mode=
pressrelease ; NATO Secretary General travels to Istanbul to attend the Libya Contact
Group meeting, July 15, 2011 available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-23344093-
1DAE4FOC/natolive/news76408.htm?mode=pressrelease.
42. African Union Peace and Security Council 275th Meeting Communique of April 26,
2011 (PSC/MIN/COMM.2(CCLXXV).
43. Declaration of the Ministerial Meeting of the Peace and Security Council on the




in its implementation to act in a manner fully consistent with interna-
tional legality and the resolution's provisions ensuring the protection
of the civilian population. 4 5 In particular, the African Union urged all
involved to refrain from actions, including military operations target-
ing Libyan Senior Officials and socio-economic infrastructure, that the
African Union thought would further compound the situation and
make it more difficult to achieve international consensus on the best
way forward. 4 6 The African Union called upon the African Commis-
sion on International Law to consider in-depth the scope and legal
implications of both United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1970
and 1973.47 It went on, among other things, demanding that all par-
ties respect international humanitarian law and strongly condemning
the attacks and other abuses directed at African migrant workers. 4 8
The African Union went on to reaffirm the legitimacy and seriousness
of the concerns of the countries of the Northern and Sahelo-Saharan
regions with regard to the humanitarian and security implications of
the situation in Libya, in particular as it relates to the proliferation of
arms, terrorism and transnational crime. 49
The African Union continued its insistence on a political and
diplomatic solution to the Libyan crisis, elaborating on June 30 and
July 1, 2011 Proposals for a Framework Agreement on a Political Solu-
tion to the Crisis in Libya and communicating them to and seeking
support for the African initiative from the other international govern-
mental organizations, as well as bilateral partners.5 0 At the same time,
outside funding was given the rebels,5 1 rebels were armed by outside
states (consistent with Resolution 1973 which overrode the ban in Res-
olution 1970),52 and the NATO led air campaign operated under what




48. Id. In this regard a meeting with the head of the International Committee of the
Red Cross on its activities related to peace and security in Africa from the perspective of the
promotion of the international human rights law was held right after the April 26, 2011
meeting. African Union Peace and Security Council Press Statement of the 276th meeting
of April 28, 2011, (PSC/BR/BR.(CCLXXVI)).
49. African Union Peace and Security Council 275th Meeting Communique of April 26,
2011, (PSC/MIN/COMM.2(CCLXXV).
50. African Union Peace and Security Council Press Statement of the 285th Meeting of
July 13, 2011, (PSC/PR/PS/2.(CCLXXXV).
51. Libya: Contact group creates fund for rebels, BBC NEWS (May 5, 2011), available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13292852?print=true.
52. French arming of Libya' rebels strategic, BBC NEWS (Jun. 29, 2011), available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13966976?print=true.
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appeared to be a definition of what was necessary to protect civilians
and civilian populated areas under the threat of attack that, contrary
to the African Union's position, could include Libyan Senior Officials.
By the end of August and September 2011, as noted above for
the Security Council, the African Union maintained its diplomatic ef-
forts for a political solution as the Transitional National Council
gained more control of the country and the Libyan government's con-
trol began to wane.53 After the death of Col. Muammar Gadhafi, the
African Union on October 20, 2011 stated it relied on the assurances of
the Transitional National Council of Libya, stressing 1) its strategic
commitment to the African continent, 2) its commitment to give prior-
ity to national unity and to bring together all Libyan stakeholders,
without any exception, to rebuild the country, and 3) its commitment to
protect all foreign workers within Libya, including the African migrant
workers. 54 In a significant development that addressed a potential
contradiction with Article 30 of the Constitutive Act of the African
Union of 2000 ("Governments which shall come to power through un-
constitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the
activities of the Union."55 ), the African Union decided "in view of the
[assurances of the Transitional National Council] above and taking
into account the uniqueness of the situation in Libya and the excep-
tional circumstances surrounding it, and without prejudice to the
relevant African Union instruments, to authorize the current authori-
ties in Libya to occupy the seat of Libya in the African Union and its
organs."56 As to the differences of emphasis with the United Nations
on the issues of peace and security, the African Union decided to con-
tinue the institutional dialogue with the United Nations on the
appropriate modalities of each organization's intervention on these is-
sues in Africa.57
53. African Union Peace and Security Council 291st Meeting Communique of August
26, 2011, (PSC/AHG/COMM.(CCXCI); African Union Peace and Security Council 294th
Meeting Communique of September 21, 2011, (PSC/MIN/COMM(CCXCIV);
54. African Union Peace and Security Council 297th Meeting Communique of October
20, 2011, (PSC/PRICOMM/2.(CCXCVII).
55. Article 30, Constitutive Act of the African Union, available at http://www.africa-
union.org/root/aulAboutAU/ConstitutiveActen.htm.
56. African Union Peace and Security Council 297th Meeting Communique of October
20, 2011, (PSC/PR/COMM/2.(CCXCVII).




b. League of Arab States - Diplomatic Role
On February 23, 2011, the League of Arab States (Arab League)
suspended Libya in a protest of the Libyan government's crackdown on
protestors.5 8 On March 2, 2011, the Arab League opposed a military
intervention urging the use of diplomatic and peaceful means before
resorting to force.5 9 On March 10, 2011, the Arab League called for a
no-flight zone over Libya.60 On March 20, 2011, shortly after the pas-
sage of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 on March
17, 2011, and the beginning of the Anglo-French bombing campaign
that became the NATO campaign (see below), the Arab League con-
demned the bombing campaign in Libya saying its call for the no-flight
zone was based on a desire to prevent Col. Muammar Gaddafi's air
force from attacking civilians and was not designed to endorse the in-
tense bombing and missile attacks.6 1 This condemnation was muted a
day later in further comments when the Arab League head said they
respected the Security Council's resolution and that the Security Coun-
cil and the Arab League were united on the need to protect civilians. 62
By June 21, 2011, the Arab League leadership admitted having second
thoughts about the bombing campaign and called for a cease-fire and a
political solution.63 On August 25, 2011, Libya was readmitted to the
Arab League which accepted that the Transitional National Council
take Libya's seat as a permanent member on its Council.64
58. Natasha Mozgovaya, Shlomo Shamir and News Agencies, Arab League suspends
Libya as deadly crackdown persists, HAARETS (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.
haaretz.com/news/international/arab-league-suspends-libya-as-deadly-crackdown-persists-
1.345096. ; Libya regains Arab League Seat, AL-JAZEERA (Aug. 27, 2011), available at http://
www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/08/2011827223817990105.html.
59. Military intervention in Libya opposed by OIC, Arab League, ARABNEWS (Mar. 2,
2011), available at http://arabnews.com/middleeastarticle293526.ece.
60. Ethan Bronner and Davis Sanger, Arab League Endorses No-Flight Zone Over
Libya, WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 12, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/13/
world/middleeast/13libya.html?pagewanted=all.
61. Edward Cody, Arab League Condemns Broad Bombing Campaign in Libya,
WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 20, 2011), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
arab-league-condemns-broad-bombing-campaign-in-libya/2011/03/20/ABlpSglstory.html.
62. LIBYA: Arab League head backs off after criticizing airstrikes, Los ANGELES TIMES
(Mar. 21, 2011), available at http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2011/03/libya-
arab-league-head-backs-off-from-criticism-of-no-fly-zone.html.
63. Ian Traynor, Arab League chief admits second thoughts about Libya air strikes,
THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 21, 2011), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/21/
arab-league-chief-libya-air-strikes.
64. Libya regains Arab League Seat, AL-JAZEERA (Aug. 27, 2011), available at
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/08/2011827223817990105.html; Arab League
recognises Libya's NTC, FRANCE 24 (Aug. 25, 2011), available at http://www.france24.com/
en/20110825-arab-league-recognises-libya-national-transitional-council.
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c. Organization of Islamic Cooperation - Diplomatic and
Humanitarian Role
On February 20, 2011, the Secretary General of the Organiza-
tion of Islamic Cooperation (OIC - formerly the Organization of the
Islamic Conference) condemned the excessive use of force against civil-
ians65 and drew attention to a humanitarian crisis of catastrophic
proportions in Libya.66 On February 28, 2011, Libya requested that
the OIC send a fact-finding mission to Libya to review the situation.67
On March 1, 2011, the OIC made an urgent appeal for help with the
evacuation of displaced persons along the Egyptian and Tunisian bor-
ders of Libya and soon after started providing humanitarian
assistance.68 On March 2, 2011, at the same time as the Arab League,
the OIC opposed a military intervention and urged the use of diplo-
matic and peaceful means before resorting to force.69 On March 8,
2011, the OIC aligned itself with those calling for a no-fly zone to pro-
tect civilians in Libya and called for restraint.70
The Secretary General of the OIC succinctly stated the interna-
tional law issues he saw in Libya in his allocution of March 8, 2011 to
the OIC:
65. OIC General Secretariat Condemns Strongly the Excessive Use of Force against
Civilians in the Libyan Jamahiriya, ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (Feb. 22, 2011),
available at http://www.oic-oci.org/topic-detail.asp?t-id=4947&x-key=.
66. Ihsanoglu Presses International Community On Immediate Assistance For Persons
Displaced By Disturbances In Libya, ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (Feb. 24,
2011), available at http://www.oic-oci.org/topic-detail.asp?t id=4966&xkey=.
67. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya requests OIC General Secretariat to dispatch fact-finding
mission, ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (Feb. 28, 2011), available at http://www.
oic-oci.org/topic detail.asp?t id=4984&xkey=.
68. Ihsanoglu launched an urgent appeal for assistance in evacuating the displaced on
the Egyptian and Tunisian borders with Libya, ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION
(Mar. 1, 2011), available at http://www.oic-oci.org/topic detail.asp?t id=4994&xkey=;
Secretary General Makes Urgent Appeal For Assistance To Evacuate Displaced Persons On
Tunisia-Libya Border And Warns Of Epidemic Outbreak, ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC
COOPERATION (Mar. 3, 2011), available at http://www.oic-oci.org/topic detail.asp?t id=5010
&x key=; OIC Commences Distribution Of Assistance To Displaced Persons On Libyan
Border, ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (Mar. 7, 2011), available at http://www.oic-
oci.org/topicdetail.asp?t id=5020&x key=.
69. Military intervention in Libya opposed by OIC, Arab League, ARABNEWS (Mar. 2,
2011), available at http://arabnews.com/middleeast/article293526.ece.
70. Ihsanoglu Support No-Fly Decision At Oic Meeting On Libya, Calls For An Islamic
Humanitarian Programme In And Outside Libya., ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION
(Mar. 8, 2011), available at http://www.oic-oci.org/topic-detail.asp?tjid=5031&xkey=;
Final Communique Issued By The Emergency Meeting Of The Committee Of Permanent
Representatives To The Organization Of The Islamic Conference On The Alarming
Developments In Libyan Jamahiriya, ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (Mar. 8,
2011), available at http://www.oic-oci.org/topic-detail.asp?t-id=5022&x-key=.
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International law provides that one of the primary duties of any
state is to guarantee for its citizens the right to livelihood and to
freedom and security. The same law makes it a duty for the state to
respect the human rights of its people and their basic freedoms.
And, based on these inalienable legal rules, we felt it incumbent
upon us to condemn these serious developments which the human
Rights Council depicted as practices that are tantamount to crimes
against humanity, involving flagrant relations of the human rights
in Libya, along with the attendant military aggressions against ci-
vilians and the mass-killings outside the scope of law, as well as the
indiscriminate detention, jailing and torture. We still insist that it
is the Libyan authorities' duty to assure its responsibility and pro-
tect its citizens, to end all human rights violations against them,
and to refrain from aggressing civilians. It also must respect the
human rights and freedoms of its citizens including the freedom of
expression and assembly, to release all the detainees that were ar-
rested indiscriminately, and to put an end to all punitive measures
against the citizens who took part in the peaceful demonstrations,
and respect the people's will and aspirations.71
On March 19, 2011, the OIC took an approach that welcomed
the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 of March 17,
2011. The approach called for the establishment of a ban on all flights
in the airspace of Libya in order to help protect civilians, cease hostili-
ties and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Libya.
The OIC also requested that Member States contribute to the imple-
mentation of this resolution. In this connection, the OIC supported the
provision in the resolution which excluded a foreign occupation force of
any form on any part of Libyan territory, and called for the adoption of
a new resolution by the Security Council to annul the provisions of
Resolution 1973 as soon as the motives standing behind its adoption
have disappeared. 72 Consistent with the opposition previously ex-
pressed to military intervention, the OIC appeared to not speak
directly to the part of the Resolution 1973 that authorized the use of
force. On March 23, 2011, through its Secretary General, the OIC re-
quested that all sides avoid targeting of civilians.73 On March 25,
71. Statement Of Professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu Oic Secretary General To The
Meeting Of The Permanent Representatives On The Situation In The Libyan Jamahiriya,
ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (Mar. 8, 2011), available at http://www.oic-oci.org/
topic detail.asp?t-id=5023&x key=.
72. Final Communiqug Issued By the Emergency Open Ended Ministerial Meeting of
the OIC Executive Committee on the Alarming Developments in Libyan Jamahiriya,
ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (Mar. 19, 2011), available at http://www.oic-oci.org/
topic-detail.asp?t id=5057&xkey=Libya.
73. Ihsanoglu Calls on All Parties in the Military Operations in Libya to Avoid
Targeting Civilians, ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (Mar. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.oic-oci.org/topic detail.asp?t-id=5089&x-key=Libya.
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2011, the OIC participated in the African Union meetings on Libya.7 4
At the Libyan Contact Group meeting in London on March 29, 2011,
the OIC called on all parties to show restraint and sought to encourage
a political solution to the humanitarian catastrophe in Libya.75 The
OIC continued its work in Libya repatriating displaced persons.76 At
the April 13-14, 2011 Libyan Contact Group meeting, the OIC called
for an integrated roadmap approach and a political solution to the Lib-
yan crisis.77
By May 7, 2011, the OIC went on to express their support for
the UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973. They urged the
international community to remain within the limits of the mandate
given by the Security Council in these resolutions while dealing with
the Libyan crisis and, in particular, the need to put special emphasis
on the protection of civilians. The Secretary General of the OIC ap-
pealed to all parties involved in the on-going military operations in
Libya to exercise maximum restraint, avoid targeting civilians and
populated areas and preserve the resources and properties of the Lib-
yan people.7 8  The organization, through its Secretary General,
continued diplomatic efforts, and on August 22, 2011 and October 20,
2011, congratulated the Libyan people for their revolution and reiter-
ated the OIC support for the Transitional National Council.79 By
74. OIC Participates In African Union High-Level Ad-Hoc Meeting On Libya,
ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (Mar. 26, 2011), available at http://www.oic-oci.org/
topic-detail.asp?t-id=5107&x key= .
75. Ihsanoglu calls upon the International Community to preserving Unity, Territorial
Integrity and Independence of Libya, ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (Mar. 29,
2011), available at http://www.oic-oci.org/topic-detail.asp?t id=5119&x_key=.
76. OIC begins repatriating displaced people on Libyan borders to their countries,
ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (Apr. 5, 2011), available at http://www.oic-oci.org/
topic detail.asp?t id=5150&x key=.
77. Ihsanoglu Calls for Coordinated International Positions and Agreement on
Integrated Road Map to End Bloodshed in Libya, ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION
(Apr. 13, 2011), available at http://www.oic-oci.org/topic detail.asp?tid=5199&x_key=;
Ihsanoglu emphasizes the need for a political solution to the Libyan crisis and for an
inclusive political process to allow Libyans determine their own future, ORGANISATION OF
ISLAMIC COOPERATION (Apr. 16, 2011), available at http://www.oic-oci.org/topic-detail.asp?t
id=5201&x key=.
78. Ihsanoglu: Political solution to the Libyan crisis is the only way to bring lasting
peace to Libya, ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (May 7, 2011), available at http://
www.oic-oci.org/topic detail.asp?t id=5279&xkey=.
79. The Secretary General Congratulates the Libyan People for the Success of their
Revolution and Reiterates OIC's Support to the National Transitional Council,
ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (Aug. 22, 2011), available at httpl//www.oic-oci.org/
topic detail.asp?t id=5588&x key=; OIC Congratulates Libyan People on Successful
Revolution and Liberation of Entire Libyan Territory, ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC
COOPERATION (Oct. 20, 2011), available at http://www.oic-oci.org/topic-detail.asp?t-id=
5881&x key=.
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December 15, 2011, the Secretary General of the OIC visited Libya and
signed a cooperation agreement with the National Transitional
Council.80
3. North Atlantic Treaty Organization - Military Role
Starting with expressions of shock on February 21, 2011,81 the
North Atlantic Council moved on February 25, 2011 to monitor the Lib-
yan situation which was said to affect the safety and security of
thousands of citizens, including those from NATO countries. 82 On
March 22 and 23, 2011, NATO moved to enforce the arms embargo and
the no-fly zone as needed. 83 By March 31, 2011 NATO further ex-
panded its role by taking over command of all Libyan air operations
including actions to protect civilians and civilian centers. 84 On April
13, 2011, the Libya Contact Group held a meeting requesting that
Gadhafi step down from power. Shortly after the meeting, NATO min-
isters strongly endorsed the request that Gadhafi leave power.85 In
June, NATO extended its mission in Libya for 90 days and in Septem-
ber further extended it - this time pursuant to the mandate in the
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2009 and at the request of
the Transitional National Council.86 With the death of Col. Muammar
Gadhafi, on October 20, 2011, the NATO Secretary General announced
that NATO and its partners had successfully implemented the historic
mandate of the United Nations to protect the people of Libya. NATO
80. Historical visit to Tripoli Ihsanoglu meets with Libyan Leaders, signs cooperation
Agreement and reiterates support for the New Libya, ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION
(Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www.oic-oci.org/topic-detail.asp?t-id=6132&x-key=.
81. Statement by the NATO Secretary General on events in Libya, Feb. 21, 2011,
available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_70731.htm?mode=pressrelease.
82. Statement by the NATO Secretary General on the situation in Libya, Feb. 25, 2011,
available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_70893.htm?mode=pressrelease.
83. Statement by the NATO Secretary General on Libya arms embargo, Mar. 22, 2011,
available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-7D337D32-88273C2D/natolive/news 71689.
htm?mode=pressrelease; NATO Secretary General's statement on no-fly zone over Libya,
Mar. 23, 2011, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-E510CFA2-7BED72BA/natolive/
news_71722.htm?mode=pressrelease.
84. NATO takes command in Libya air operations, Mar. 31, 2011, available at
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-A3316B86-E49FB2C2/natolive/news_71867.htm?mode=
pressrelease.
85. Statement on Libya following the working lunch of NATO Ministers of Foreign
Affairs with non-NATO contributors to Operation Unified Protector, Apr. 14, 2011,
available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-87B4C257-B3B3E6BA/natolive/official texts
72544.htm?mode=pressrelease.
86. NATO Secretary General statement on NAC decision to extend Libya mission, Sep.
21, 2011, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-938419C4-92F53860/natolive/news
78355.htm?mode=pressrelease.
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would terminate its mission in coordination with the United Nations
and the National Transitional Council. NATO also called for restraint
and no reprisals.87 The North Atlantic Council on October 21, 2011
agreed that the operations were nearing completion and took a prelimi-
nary decision to end the operation on October 31, 2011.88
4. Discussion
I started this essay with a quote from Aeschylus that stated "In
war, truth is the first casualty." I felt this reminder was important as
each of the institutions described above gathered and evaluated infor-
mation concerning the events in Libya to determine each of their
courses of action. I have provided a somewhat belabored presentation
of the approaches of the United Nations Security Council and key in-
ternational governmental organizations to the Libyan crisis in order to
somewhat memorialize their reactions and subsequent strategies as
they were confronted with these events. A plethora of individual state,
non-governmental organizations, or other international governmental
organization reactions might be added to round out this presentation
but, in the interest of space, only a partial rendition of the complexities
of the international reaction seemed appropriate in a paper focused on
President Obama's approach to the Libyan crisis. The hope is this
brief picture helps the reader understand the international pressures
on the United States that helped develop the policy of President
Obama and his Administration.
A most critical first analysis of all parties concerned was in the
early January and February 2011 period, as to the nature and extent of
the human rights and humanitarian law violations of the Libyan gov-
ernment. The reactions in that early period of the international
governmental organizations canvassed above reflect a consensus that
the Libyan government's suppression of the legitimate aspirations of
the Libyan people was extensive and violent. Whether we think in
terms of arbitrary deprivation of life or torture under international
human rights law or ignoring the principle of distinction with regard to
civilians who are not directly participating in hostilities or in a contin-
87. Statement by the NATO Secretary General on Libya, Oct. 20, 2011, available at
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-77D79283-9CC54AAD/natolive/news_79742.htm?mode=
pressrelease.
88. North Atlantic Council Statement on Libya, Oct. 21, 2011, available at http://www.
nato.int/cps/en/SID-63360991-89303911/natolive/news_79800.htm?mode=pressrelease;





uous combat function in a NIAC in international humanitarian law,
the facts on the ground appeared sufficiently grave for all of the insti-
tutions involved.
The key institutional divergences appeared to crystallize at two
key points. The first point was in the period between the adoption of
the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970 of February 17,
2011 which put in place measures short of the use of force and the
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 of March 17, 2011
that, inter alia, authorized the use of force to protect civilians and civil-
ian populated areas under the threat of attack while excluding a
foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.
The second was with the manner in which the use of force was per-
ceived to evolve over the course of the military intervention up to and
including the killing of Col. Muammar Gadhafi. I will discuss these
two key periods in particular.
In the interregnum between the early condemnations of the
events in Libya up to the United Nations Security Council Resolution
1970 and the adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tion 1973, the African Union was most emphatic in rejecting any
foreign military intervention of whatever form in Libya. In this sense,
examining the same events as all the other international governmental
organizations, the African Union's view was that foreign military inter-
vention was not authorized and should not take place. Instead,
through the African Union roadmap process, the Mrican Union sought
to foster a political and diplomatic negotiation that would include all
Libyan stakeholders with the goal of developing a negotiated solution
to the conflict. Long familiar and suspicious of the motives of foreign
interventions on the African continent, the African Union sought to
fashion an African solution to the Libyan crisis. Such a solution took
into account the domestic Libyan parameters but also addressed the
African Union concerns for the plight of African migrant workers and
the regional impact of the crisis. The Arab League and the OIC took a
similar, though it seems less categorical, approach, urging the resort to
political and diplomatic methods before the use of force.
Under the current international system, in the absence of a sit-
uation of self-defense triggering Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations, the United Nations Security Council is charged with evaluat-
ing threats to the peace and authorizing the use of force.89 All member
89. I am well aware of the efforts to argue a third paradigm for self-defense for armed
attacks less than those that trigger Article 51 and/or responsibility to protect without
United Nations Security Council authorization, but leave these arguments to the side, at
least partially, because there is United Nations Security Council Resolution authorizing the
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states are to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolutions
on their own, collectively or through the international agencies to
which they belong. This primacy of the United Nations Security Coun-
cil under the Charter of the United Nations over the member states,
and by extension the other international governmental organizations
also concerned by the situation, was well reflected in the reaction of the
African Union, the Arab League, and the OIC to the passage of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 authorizing the use of force.
These international governmental organizations' responses ranged
from "respect" to "welcoming" said Resolution 1973, apparently seeking
by such language to avoid an outright direct organizational conflict on
foreign military intervention and, in so doing, demonstrating a defer-
ence, if only slight but certainly non-negligible, to the United Nations
Security Council's determination.
Of course, the actual authorization to use force to protect civil-
ians and civilian populated areas under the threat of attack while
excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan
territory is subject to interpretation in its application. In this regard,
as the conflict turned from one where the principal legal regimes were
international human rights/NIAC international humanitarian law, to
a more NIAC/IAC international humanitarian law conflict with signifi-
cant international intervention in the prosecution of the armed
conflict, the overall level of lethality of the weaponry across the battle-
field was increased. Divergences as to the appropriate calculus in
terms of military objectives, military advantage, principles of neces-
sity, proportionality, and distinction, funding and arming of the rebels
appear across all of the international governmental organizations and
actors. Moreover, that on April 13, 2011, the Libyan Contact Group
called for Gadhafi to leave power suggests that his presence at the
helm of the Libyan state had come to be viewed as an obstacle to pro-
tecting civilian and civilian populated areas. Put another way, the
military objective and military advantage of Gadhafi being removed
from power became overtly crystallized at the political level and en-
dorsed at the military level by NATO.
Removing Gadhafi as a military objective, in a state run by him
and his family appeared to change the calculus in terms of what was
the range of acceptable uses of force under the United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1973 civilian protection parameters for achieving
use of force. My personal views are closer to those of Antonio Cassese and the threat to
global security of such approaches. See Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We
Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in
the World Community?, EJIL 23 (1999).
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such an objective. The range of views as to what was an acceptable
deployment of force ranged from that of NATO which considered all of
its operations to have been done in compliance with the United Na-
tions Security Council Resolution 1973 and the laws of war, through
the somewhat ambivalent positions on use of force of the Arab League
and the OIC, through to the African Union's view that Libyan Senior
Officials should be spared (which I understand as meaning the Libyan
Senior Officials should not be targeted for the military advantage that
might be gained from their killing whether for their continuous combat
function in a NIAC or status in an IAC). Whatever the stated position
and the legality of the result, with the rapid recognition and integra-
tion by all of these international governmental organizations (and
states) of the National Transitional Council before and after the killing
of Col. Muammar Gadhafi, one appears led to a conclusion that
whether or not such an objective was a legitimate military objective, all
the international governmental organizations involved acquiesced to
this extra-constitutional violent transfer of power.
Yet, the transfer of power does not end the story. During the
past year, the Gadhafi government's violations of international human
rights and international humanitarian law (NIAC and/or JAC) rules
were alleged and documented by non-governmental organizations and
claims of the rebels and press. At the same time, as they have gained
power, the rebels also have been accused of gross violations of the rele-
vant legal regimes, also, in places such as Tawergha where revenge
exactions against a primarily black Libyan populace was alleged to
have been committed by those in the nearby town of Misurata.90 The
plight of thousands of non-Libyan and black Africans held in makeshift
prisons is a further dramatic situation that is painfully slowly being
addressed.9 1 The torture of persons believed to be Gadhafi loyalists has
also been signaled since the fall of the Gadhafi regime. 92 And, the ap-
parent murder of Col. Muammar Gadhafi once he was under the
90. Tarik Kafala, 'Cleansed' Libyan Town Spills its Terrible Secrets, , BBC NEWS MAG
(Dec. 12, 2011) available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-16051349?print=true.
91. Rami Al-Shaheibi, Libya: Justice Ministry to Take Over Prisons, ABC NEWS, (Jan.
29, 2012) available at http://abcnews.go.com/lnternational/wireStory/libya-justice-ministry-
prisons-15467563.
92. Id.
94. Doctors Without Borders says it halts work in Libyan city's prisons because of
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control of the rebels93 and the apparent murder of prisoners completely
within the control of one or another of the parties to this conflict re-
main vivid in the collective conscience. 94 Beyond the Gadhafi loyalists
and rebels, the insistent questions as to civilian casualties resulting
from the NATO-led bombing remain unresolved.9 5 The reality of these
results of the conflict suggest that, whatever the prevailing view at the
end, the other views expressed at the beginning across the interna-
tional governmental organizations as to the appropriate path to
address the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people also have their
vitality as they remind all concerned of the need for sustained engage-
ment with Libya as it moves through the current transition.
II. DOMESTIC UNITED STATES LEGAL REGIME
Given the texture and complexity of the facts in the interna-
tional legal regime discussed above, addressing the domestic United
States legal regime might at first blush appear to be a simpler task.
Yet, that would be an error because of the intersection between the
United States political and diplomatic roles and treaty obligations as
both a member of the United Nations and as one of the five permanent
members of the United Nations Security Council ( a guarantor of the
international system) and its role in NATO with regard to: 1) the sepa-
ration of powers under the United States Constitution, 2) the War
Powers Resolution, and 3) the sophistication and extent of the United
States' military, intelligence and other assets that could be brought to
bear in the Libyan situation.
The crucial dilemma for any United States President is the in-
tersection between, on the one hand, the Charter of the United Nations
obligations and, on the other hand, the Commander in Chief and Chief
Executive, Foreign Affairs, and Declare War powers of the United
States Constitution and the War Powers Resolution (whether or not it
is considered constitutional). The Declare War power, as a matter of
93. Barry Malone, Gaddafi Killed in Hometown, Libya Eyes Future, REUTERS (Oct. 20,
2011) available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/20/us-libya-idUSTRE79FlFK
20111020.
94. AFP, Pro-Qaddafi 'Mass Murderer' Awaits Fate in Libyan Jail, AL ARABIYA NEWS,
(Jan. 31, 2012) available at http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/01/31/191670.html.
95. C. J. Chivers and Eric Schmitt, In Strikes on Libya by NATO, an Unspoken
Civilian Toll, NEW YORK TIMES, (Dec. 17, 2011) available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
12/18/world/africalscores-of-unintended-casualties-in-nato-war-in-libya.html?
pagewanted=all. See generally, United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the
International Commission of Inquiry on Libya (Advanced Unedited Version) dated Mar. 2,
2012 (AIHRC/19/68) available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/03/03/world/
africa/united-nations-report-on-libya.html.
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constitutional construction, would appear to leave the power to declare
war exclusively in the hands of Congress (requiring an explicit declara-
tion of war even, rather than just an Authorization of the Use of
Military Force). Yet, the number of armed conflicts since World War 1I
to which the United States has been a party without such a declaration
(as opposed to an authorization of use of military force) suggests that
the situation is more nuanced.96 In an analysis of the approach to be
taken, a new approach described as the Clinton/Obama formula has
been suggested as the manner in which to determine appropriate ac-
tion. In the Clinton/Obama formula, Congressional authorizations of
military force appear to have been the operative method for the United
States to enter military interventions of a more significant duration,
intensity or scope in the post-World War II era - with the exception of
Korea.97 At the same time, again in the Clinton/Obama view, some
Presidential unilateralism might be permitted for military interven-
tions of lesser duration, intensity and scope - the brief and relatively
costless (in blood and treasure) interventions.98 While superficially at-
tractive, of course, the problem with this approach is a bit obvious: it is
very difficult to know a priori what will be the duration, intensity and
scope of a conflict - and therefore whether the President should have
acted unilaterally or sought Congressional approval. Thus, at the time
of the action, whatever the rationale, the President in our Constitu-
tional structure makes a choice: to act unilaterally or to act with
Congressional approval.
Let us now think about that Presidential choice within the over-
lay of the United Nations structure. In the United Nations era, as the
principal guarantor (or at least as one of the five permanent members
that are principal guarantors together) of the international system, I
believe a further central thought experiment type question is whether
the President of the United States can constitutionally vote in any cir-
cumstances in the United Nations Security Council to authorize the
use of force in the absence of a specific prior Congressional approval
(we might call this the "Congressional deliberative maximalist posi-
tion"). If one considers the Charter of the United Nations as a treaty
obligation of the United States the constitutional interaction with the
96. An excellent discussion on Libya and Presidential War Powers is summarized by
Benjamin Wittes, Peter Margulies Reports on AALS III, Jan. 12, 2012, available at http://
www.lawfareblog.com/2012/01/peter-margulies-reports-on-aals-iiil.
97. Id.
98. Id. I leave to the side those who might be described in all circumstances as
Congressional exclusivists (Congressional power only) or Presidential unilateralists
(unfettered Presidential power).
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language of the War Powers Resolution at Section 8 further suggests
the general need for prior Congressional approval, to wit:
"SEC. 8. (a) Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into
hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances shall not be inferred-
(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such
treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the in-
troduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into
such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute specific
statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution."
(Emphasis added).99
Under this part of the War Powers Resolution, when the United
Nations Security Council authorizes the use of force under its Chapter
VII powers of the Charter of the United Nations and the United States
votes in favor of such a resolution, a reasonable interpretation of that
act might be that at the moment of that vote, the involvement in hostil-
ities is clearly indicated. In such a case, so the argument would go, the
situation would fit within the Section 8(a)(2) language indicating spe-
cific prior authority from Congress would be needed for such a United
Nations Security Council vote by the United States. Failing such Con-
gressional authorization, the Executive would be without power to
engage the United States through a favorable vote. Such a Congres-
sional deliberative maximalist approach would encourage the vetting
of such proposed authorizations very carefully by both the Executive
and Legislative branches and assure that our engagements under the
auspices of the United Nations would have the fullest bicameral sup-
port. Of course, as a practical matter again, this kind of deliberative
approach before a United Nations vote has probably never consciously
occurred - suggesting it is more a thought experiment of how the
United States could interact with the world rather than how it does
interact with the world. To take a recent example, in the 1991 Gulf
War, the United States voted in favor of the United Nations Security
Council Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990 authorizing the use of
force before the Authorization of Use of Military Force was passed by
Congress on January 12, 1991.
Conversely, when an Article 51 of the Charter of the United Na-
tions self-defense setting is not present, but the United States
Congress (or the President alone) authorizes the use of military force,
in the absence of a prior or subsequent Security Council Resolution
authorizing that use of force, the question arises whether as a matter
of international law (whatever the result under domestic law) the
99. War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2006).
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United States is in compliance with its Charter of the United Nations
obligations if it enters hostilities. Again, as a practical matter, the
manner in which the United States commenced the War in Iraq can be
interpreted by reasonable people as an act without any prior or subse-
quent authorization by the United Nations Security Council.' 00 As a
matter of domestic Constitutional law, such a declaration of war might
be seen as properly entering an armed conflict but, as a matter of inter-
national law, such declaration is seen as aggressive war. This
approach might be described as the "American unilateralist approach."
Where does Libya fit? In his legal rationale, the President as-
serted his Constitutional authority to direct this limited military
operation abroad and viewed the United States military operations
were distinct from the "hostilities" contemplated by the War Powers
Resolution 60 day termination provision.10 1 The President asserted he
authorized these actions 1) to limit the spread of violence and instabil-
ity in a region pivotal to our security interests, particularly while it is
undergoing sensitive transitions, 2) to prevent an imminent humanita-
rian catastrophe, and 3) to show the people of the Middle East and
North Africa that America stands with them at a time of momentous
transition.102 In the absence of the asserted need for Congressional
authorization, the President went on to detail, nevertheless, the extent
of Congressional consultation since February 2011.103
In taking this approach, the President appears to have shaped
the nature of the military operations that the United States was will-
ing to undertake in a manner that would assure sufficient
Congressional acquiescence (even without Congressional mollifica-
tion). The shape of this intervention with no troops (at least non-covert
forces) on the ground in Libya and the use of air assets and drones in
an environment of absolute air supremacy reduced significantly the
risks in blood. The distribution of tasks under the NATO-led structure
also helped to reduce the risks in treasure to a manageable estimated
$1 billion. The immediate contrast with the costs of the War in Iraq, of
100. The impact of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 of November 8,
2002 and the import of references back in the Authorization to Use Military Force in Iraq of
2002 to United Nations Security Council Resolutions 678 (1990) and 687 (1991) are subjects
of rich discussion outside the scope of this article.
101. Report on United States Activities in Libya to Speaker of the House, Jun. 15, 2011
at 25.
102. Report, supra note 102 at 2-3.
103. Report, supra note 102 at 26-31.; One notable historical point about the United
States and Libya is that from Jefferson to Regan to Obama, apparently every U.S.
intervention in Libya occurred without clear Congressional authorization. See Benjamin
Wittes, Peter Margulies Reports on AALS III, Jan. 12, 2012, available at http://www.
lawfareblog.com/2012/01/peter-margulies-reports-on-aals-iii/.
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over four thousand dead troops, thousands of wounded, and $ 1 trillion
in treasure, is obvious.
Yet, the aftermath of the war in Libya, like the aftermath in
Iraq, is still being written and lived. It appears clear that the new
Libya will have years of unsettled consolidation of power and re-struc-
turing ahead. Whether the aspirations of all the Libyans for
meaningful enjoyment and recognition of human rights will occur or
descend into another form of oppression is being determined each day.
The outcome is uncertain but the need for meaningful and prompt en-
gagement from all sides and the international community is without
doubt. In a time of tight budgets, the United States role over the years
ahead may be severely constrained. Whether other nations step into
any vacuum of engagement to attempt to anchor and then encourage
the aspirations of the Libyan people is another imponderable about
which we must wait and see.
III. A SUMMARY, A REGRET, AND A CONCLUSION
In the first section, I describe the international legal regime in
which the Libyan intervention came to occur. I highlighted the roles of
several key international government organizations to which Libya
was a member or which played crucial roles in the Libyan conflict. My
goal was to have the reader - particularly one not familiar with the
international plane - get a sense of the dynamics on the international
plane and the legal consequences of the approaches taken on that
plane. In the second section, I guided the reader from the United
States' role on the international plane back through our domestic con-
stitutional structure to understand how the domestic United States
regime operated with regard to Libya. Here, I noted the international
and domestic legal structures that impinge on a President's autonomy
in our Constitutional structure. I pointed out how President Obama
navigated those constraints through, on the one hand, garnering inter-
national support through the United Nations Security Council and
NATO approval of an intervention and, on the other hand, minimizing
(i.e. no boots on the ground) the nature of the American dimension of
the intervention so as to be able to argue at least minimal compliance
with Constitutional and War Powers Resolution constraints. In this
third section, I seek to add some more personal thoughts about this
intervention so far for posterity.
As a person who lived in Europe and watched Timisoara and
Srebrenica happen, who saw the Rwandan genocide happen before his
eyes, and who had lived through the Biafran War in Nigeria, the Alge-
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rian War from the perch of Tunisia, as a Libero-American (an
American born in Liberia) instead of an Americo-Liberian (descendant
of slaves sent back to Africa) or indigenous Liberian, as a person who
worked many years in international commercial arbitration with won-
derful colleagues from Libya and from all the countries of the Arab
Spring, as I watched events unfold, I tried to understand as an ordi-
nary citizen the dramatic events occurring before my eyes. My central
concern was with what was the best way to support the legitimate as-
pirations of the Libyan people. As has been shown above, people of
goodwill did differ on the path to take, and the range of reactions from
cynicism about the outcome to hope for a future in the outcome, have
their supporters.
I regret the killing of Gadhafi, for if there was a man who knew
too much104 - given his complex role in international relations for 42
years - he was one. Non-governmental organizations were combing
the governmental offices gathering information about the still secret
set of complex relations Gadhafi and his government had with intelli-
gence services around the world. In a criminal prosecution in Libya or
before the International Criminal Court, there would have been an ac-
counting about those activities, a sharing with the ordinary citizens of
Libya and the world of the complex processes of the governments of the
international community. Maybe some of that will occur with the
criminal prosecution in Libya of his son Seif, but I sense that Gadhafi's
killing closes a door until a future period of declassification on much
information that is closely guarded. I, for one, would like to know how
Al-Libi 05 got into Libyan hands from the Egyptian Intelligence Service
who tortured him at the request of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Just this bit of information would shed light on the person whose testi-
mony under torture was used to try to convince the world of the
propriety of the War in Iraq. I suspect there are many, many, more
nuggets about world affairs that have been lost with Gadhafi's death.
Beyond that, I think of all the Libyans who are awaking in the
brave new Libya and hope that they consider that my country and, by
extension, I (as an ordinary citizen) have kept the faith with their legit-
imate aspirations in supporting this revolution. I hope for
reconciliation among all the people of Libya, an opportunity that may
come through discussion, mediation and/or dialogue now instead of
brutal confrontation. I have deep respect for their sacrifice.
104. Benjamin G. Davis, The Man Who Knew Too Much: A Convenient Suicide in a
Libyan Prison, JURIST (May 12, 2009), available at http://jurist.1aw.pitt.edu/forumy/2009/05/
man-who-knew-too-much-convenient.php.
105. Id.
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